Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence by Drumatra, Jeff
Masthead Logo Digital Commons @ George Fox University
David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan
Genocide Archives and Museum
5-5-1998
Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Rwanda: Genocide
and the Continuing Cycle of Violence
Jeff Drumatra
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rawson_rwanda
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives and Museum at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan Genocide by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drumatra, Jeff, "Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence" (1998). David Rawson




Africa Policy Analyst 
lT.S. COIYhviiTTEE FOR REFUGEES 
on 
••R"\VA.1'IDA: GENOCIDE ANl) THE 
CONT~l.JING CYCLE OF v10LENCE" 
before the 
SUBCOiVI~IITTEE ON ~TERl~ATIONA.L OPERATIONS AN1) HUl\tL;\N RIGHTS 
HOUSE COl'vL\liTTEE ON INTERL~A. TIONA.L RELA. TIONS 
lVL~ Y 5, 1998 
'"" ~ ~ '>' ~~::;~-s ~ "='" ~-G'il:~ "" - 0, ~"' ;:; : ~ "' " '"' ~ " 
I ill ·~SSi«Cilllill!!IS~&S -~~:.1111\ IWimE III•IIBilillli'Gm:GJN, IUi.l:llll-1111 
liEllli: ~11'11111-11111 • e~: IIIII 11:1-111 s • 1-m~lll!! msmt:illfl\:sa-lliSC!lt.m~r~; 
~ ' 

Background of USCR 
I am JeffDrumtra, Africa Policy Analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Thank you 
for conducting this hearing on "Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence." 
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization 
that regularly monitors and assesses the plight of refugees and displaced people around the world, 
and their efforts to reintegrate or resettle when conditions permit. 
USCR has conducted regular site visits to Rwanda during the past 15 years to document 
conditions, analyze the political environment, and offer informed policy recommendations. USCR 
staff have undertaken 12 assessment trips to Rwanda since 1994. USCR staff were on the ground 
days before the genocide began in April 1994 and repeatedly traveled into Rwanda to document the 
genocide as it was occurring. Our two most recent visits to Rwanda were in late 1997. 
In the past four years, USCR has produced some 50 reports, action alerts, briefings, 
editorials, and public information advisories in an effort to help policy makers, the press, and the 
American public understand and respond to events in Rwanda. We published our most recent 
report, Life After Death: Suspicion and Reintegration in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in February 
1998. We have distributed copies of that report to members of this Subcommittee. We can 
provide you with all USCR publications and documents pertaining to Rwanda if you wish. 
Outline of Testimony 
This testimony consists of five sections. 
Firstly, an explanation of the purpose of this testimony and, we believe, of this hearing. 
Secondly, a brief review of action and inaction during the Rwandan genocide. 
Thirdly, a review of U.S. policy failures during the genocide. 
Fourthly, a discussion of steps to improve U.S. response in the future. 
And fifthly, a discussion of the legacy of genocide in current-day Rwanda. 
I. Purpose of Testimony 
Let's be frank. Many people-including perhaps some Members of this 
Su?committee-find it odd to hold a Congressional hearing in mid-1998 about an event and a 
sen~s ?f U.S. policy decisions that occurred four years ago in a small country that was of 
negligible strategic interest to the United States. Nothing we say here today can chanae what 
happened in Rwanda in mid-1994. Therefore some observers might view this hearin~ as an 
exercise in irrelevance as it regards the past, and an exercise in futility as it regards th~ future. 
That sense of fatalism is understandable, but dangerous. A tragedy of epic proportions 
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occurred in Rwanda in 1994. It was the frrst legally defined genocide in the post-World War II 
world. U.S. leaders shamed themselves and degraded the highest ideals of our human race by their 
inaction during Rwanda's genocide. The mass murder in Rwanda was the most intense 
bloodletting in modem times. 
USCR therefore participates in this hearing with several purposes. First, we want to help 
make the historical record of the genocide as complete and accurate as possible. 
This is the least we can do. Television cameras and journalists might be absent from this 
hearing-just as they were largely absent during the genocide itself-but we have to believe that 
history is listening and watching these proceedings. If our contemporaries ignore this hearing, at 
least we can provide a historical record for future generations. 
Secondly, we believe our testimony at this hearing can help identify U.S. mistakes 
during the genocide and assess why they occurred. President Clinton acknowledged 
during his brief visit to Rwanda in March that the U.S. government "must bear its share of 
responsibility" for the Rwandan genocide. His acknowledgement was an important frrst step, 
albeit four years late. The task today, we hope, is to identify our nation's mistakes honestly, and 
demand higher standards in the future. Parliamentary inquiries have occurred in Belgium and 
France. It is time for the United States to look in the mirror. 
Thirdly, it is probably fair to say that we all are participating in this hearing today because 
we want to fulfill a responsibility to the dead victims of genocide. Let us not shirk the 
uncomfortable truth: among the million people who lost their lives in Rwanda were hundreds of 
thousands of victims who died in part because specific U.S. officials refused to help them, 
prevented others from giving help, and refused even to acknowledge the need to help. That is the 
awful truth lurking behind President .Clinton's statement in March that "we did not act quickly 
enough after the killing began," and his confession that "we did not immediately call these crimes 
by their rightful name: f~enocide." 
...... ._, 
President Clinton told Rwandans that "we owe to those who died and to those who 
survived ... our every effort to increase our vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who 
would commit such atrocities in the future." Those are eloquent words, but are they more than 
empty rhetoric? This .AJ:nerican nation and the international community must fmd a way to rebuild 
a credible commitment to the post-Holocaust ideal of "never again." It is now clear that we as a 
nation did not really mean those noble words the frrst time. A fourth purpose here today should be 
to push, prod, urge, shrune, or inspire our nation and its leaders-beginning with some Members 
of this Human Rights Subcommittee-to dare to do better when the next awful moment 
of truth arrives elsewhere. 
Fifthly, it is our hope that this hearing will be one small step in helping to restore 
commitment and intt~grity to international humanitarian principles and 
international law. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, to which the ·united States is a signatory, is nothing more than a scrap of paper unless 
principled leaders, beginning with our own U.S. officials, infuse it with life and commitment. 
This hearing will serve an important purpose if it gives us another opportunity to reflect on the fact 
that appalling evil occurs when world powers such as the United States dismiss our own highest 
principles as empty rhetoric. 
Finally, we are participating in this hearing to help understand and render wise 
assistance to post-geiJtocide Rwanda. We want to impress upon Congress, the 
Administration, and the ,American public that a phenomenal challenge is underway at this moment 
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in post-genocide Rwanda that may well be unique _in h~man ~storr. Rarely, if ever, in recor~ed 
history has a society attempted to live together agrun, s1de by stde, m the aftermath of a genoc~de., 
It is a complex and sensitive situation. "~ e must work ~o ~emedy the conseque?ces of ~enoc1de, 
President Clinton stated in Rwanda. He IS correct. But 1t IS not a task done easily or qu1ckly. One 
purpose of this hearing, we believe, is to help channel U.S. policy in the proper direction. 
II. Genocide Revisited: Review of Information & Inaction 
Those of us in the West consistently emphasize that Rwanda's past and present leaders 
must be held accountable for their actions. We in the West are slower to acknowledge, however, 
that our own U.S. and other Western leaders also should be accountable for their actions and 
inactions, particularly at the time of the Rwandan genocide. 
In order to impose proper accountability on our own leaders for ignoring Rwanda's mass 
murder as it unfolded, it is important to make one fact abundantly clear at this hearing: Almost as 
soon as the genocide began on April 6, the cold-blooded, systematic, calculated nature of the 
killing was identifiable and comprehensible to us in the West. U.S. officials cannot credibly 
excuse their own inaction by characterizing the situation in Rwanda as ''confused" or "chaotic" or 
"beyond comprehension." Even as the genocide was occurring, the political motives behind the 
mass killings were within the scope of our Western understanding. Indeed, sources on the ground 
in Rwanda expressed alarm to USCR and to other international analysts in March and early April 
1994 that hardliners in the government were on the verge of fomenting major violence. 
Days after the genocide began, and throughout the long weeks of slaughter, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) regularly disseminated international alerts and analyses to 
inform U.S. policy makers and galvanize a response that never came. Following is a partial 
review of information and policy advocacy during the genocide, and the U.S. government's 
response to the horrific events. 
Genocide Weeks 1-2 
USCR conducted a public briefing on April 11 and stressed that the killings were an 
attempt by Rwandan hardliners to sabotage the country's peace process, rather than a spontaneous -
"tribal bloodletting." USCR \vrote to the Administration on April13 "to emphasize that the 
violence .. .is not simply due to ethnic differences." USCR' s letter explained that the killings "were 
instigated ... by hardline military and political elements determined to sabotage democratic reforms 
at all costs." USCR issued a public statement on April 14, reporting that "tens of thousands" were 
dead at the hands of "hardline political and military leaders in Rwanda ... [ who] have capitalized on 
internal ethnic divisions ... to thwart democratic reforms and terrorize the population." 
An op-ed by USCR published on April 14 warned that "it would be an unforgivable 
mistake to pass off the latest orgy of violence in Rwanda as simply another case of African tribal 
bloodletting that foreigners can never understand and are powerless to prevent.... Characterizing 
Rwanda's upheaval as the product of primordial ethnic hatreds misses the point of what is really 
happening there .... The real instigation of violence in Rwanda is shamelessly political, not 
ethnic." A USCR "Fact Sheet" published Aprill9 warned that Rwanda's "shift of violence to 
rural regions is ominous, since most Rwandans live in rural areas." 
A handful of other U.S. organizations also sounded the alarm immediately and tried to 
explain the political nature of the killings and the need for an international response to stop the 
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massacres. One of the most notable was Human Rights Watch/Africa (HRW). "The carnage that 
has been inflicted over the past two wee~ is neither random nor inevitable, and the United Nations 
can play a significant role in helping end it," HRW wrote on April19. HRW noted that "the 
campaign of killing was planned weeks before" it began. 
U.S. Policy Response During the first two weeks of the genocide, the primary response 
of the U.S. government was to evacuate .American citizens and close its embassy in Kigali. 
Genocide Week 3 
USCR conducted a joint briefing ,;vith HRW entitled "Insights Into Rwanda's Crisis." The 
April 21 briefing included one of the frrst eyewitness accounts by a Rwandan who had escaped the 
genocide. USCR staff took a team of CBS television journalists into Rwanda to provide one of the 
frrst American broadcasts of the killing and why it was occurring. 
HRW issued an analysis on April20 that Rwandan genocidaires were ousting moderate 
colleagues as part of a strategy to expand the killings into previously calm areas of the country. 
"Keeping the peace is not a goal of the authorities," HRW explained. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated on April 21 that perhaps "hundreds of thousands" were dead 
and that "the human tragedy in Rwanda is on a scale that the International Committee of the Red 
Cross has rarely witnessed." 
U.S. Policy Response During the third week of the genocide, the primary political and 
security response of the U.S. government was to strongly support the withdrawal of some 2,000 
UN peacekeeping troops from Rwanda. The United States and other UN Security Council 
members-which, incredibly, included the government of Rwanda engaged in the 
genocide-pointedly refused to give a small number of remaining UN troops authority to stop the 
killings. U.S. officials argued erroneously that the mass killings were being caused by renewed 
warfare, when in fact the;! opposite was the case-the war was re-igniting because of wholesale, 
deliberate massacres. American officials called for a ceasefrre between combatants and asked 
specific Rwandan military officials "to do everything in their power to end the violence." 
Genocide Week 4 
USCR issued a series of "Action AJlerts" and a "Media Advisory" to draw attention to the 
accelerated killings in R1.vanda and the political context for the massacres. A USCR "Action Alert" 
on May 2 made 13 recornmendations to U.S. officials and other international policy makers to 
protect Rwandan civilians, demand accountability for the massacres, and diplomatically isolate 
Rwanda's genocidaire government. USC:R~ publicly urged the U.S. government "to declare 
formally that the massacres in Rwanda constitute genocide as defined under international law." 
USCR called on the United States "to take the diplomatic and financial lead in the UN to return 
international peacekeeping troops to Rwanda." 
On May 3, USCR published, "Responding to the Rwandan Crisis: Declare Genocide, and 
Other Policy Steps," which contained 14 policy recommendations. The document encouraged 
U.S. officials to "jam" extremist radio broadcasts emanating from Kigali that were fanning the 
genocide. It called for inunediate humanitarian assistance inside rebel controlled areas of Rwanda, 
where tens of thousands of survivors and hundreds of thousands of other innocent civilians had 
congregated. It also urged U.S. authorities to strip Rwanda's genocidaire government of official 
diplomatic recognition. A USCR media advisory on May 3 reported that an estimated 200,000 
persons were already dead, and noted that American media had generally "mischaracterized" 
Rwanda's massacres as "'uncontrollable 'tribal violence.'" The advisory stated that "it is important 
to understand that the slaughter in Rwanda 'Was planned and consciously triggered by a privileged 
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clique of extremist political and military leaders.:··. !he staggering ~assacre ~f Tut~i appears to be 
an organized, calculated attempt to erase all possibility of ever forrmng a multi--ethnic, broad-based 
political system.', 
HRW continued to issue its own updates describing the campaign of bloodshed and 
reported that propaganda continued to air o~ Rwandan radio urging ~ intens~c2:tion of the 
killings. HRW called on international officials to denounce the leading genoc1darres by name. 
HRW observed that "a ceasefrre between the warring parties is largely irrelevant to the mass 
slaughter of noncombatants being carried out throughout Rwanda ... by the army and militia.', 
U.S. Policy Response During the fourth week of the genocide, the U.S. government 
supported a UN Security Council presidential statement that condemned the violence in Rwanda. 
U.S. officials effectively blocked an initiative that would have bolstered the UN' s peacekeeping 
presence in the country. 
Genocide Weeks S-6 
USCR conducted a site visit to genocide locations in Rwanda and interviewed survivors. 
USCR also assessed Rwanda's massive humanitarian needs in areas no longer controlled by the 
genocidal government. "Militia gangs are roaming the ... streets, their machetes in hand,', USCR 
reported. "They are killing any ethnic Tutsi they find. They are doing it at this moment, as we sit 
here. Just as they did it last night. And the night before that. And the week before that. And the 
week before that. And the week before that, all the way back to the night of April 6." USCR 
stated that "this is genocide.... It is the genocide we in the West legally pledged under international 
law would happen 'never again."' 
On May 16, HRW criticized the U.S. goveJ!lment for "effectively blocking" a UN vote that 
would send peacekeeping troops to Rwanda and pointed out that U.S. inaction at the UN was 
"allowing the slaughter in Rwanda to continue." The organization emphasized that "the slaughter 
of 200,000 unarmed and unresisting civilians is ... far more than a Rwandan problem. Given this 
extraordinary violation of the international laws ... this catastrophe confronts the United 
States ... with a moral imperative ... " 
U.S. Policy Response During the fifth week of the genocide, a secret report by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency stated that "there is an organized ... effort of genocide being 
implemented." During the sixth week of the genocide, the U.S. government and the UN Security 
Council formally agreed that new peacekeeping troops might be needed in Rwanda. But U.S. 
officials effectively blocked implementation by insisting on more weeks of study before allowing 
final approval. The UN resolution pointedly refused to characterize the killings as "genocide." 
Genocide Week 7 
USCR concluded its site visit to Rwanda and conducted extensive public and private 
briefings for U.S. government officials, NGOs, and journalists in Washington, D.C. and 
elsewhere. USCR cited flaws in U.S. government analysis of the killings. USCR recommended 
additional peacekeeping troops and explained how to deploy them effectively. Our agency reported 
"a dramatic need for medical services" for wounded civilians inside Rwanda, and rec7,mmended 
that U.S. humanitarian officials and NGOs could work safely in eastern zones of the country. We 
~rged_govemment aid officials to send an assessment team to Rwanda and repeated calls for the 
Jarrurung of Rwanda's "hate radio." 
?ther human rights and humanit_ari_an NGOs remained seized with the crisis and the daily 
loss of hves. HRW deplored U.S. restnct1ons on UN peacekeeping troops and urged "the United 
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States to immediately cease obstructing efforts to come to the aid of thousands of persons 
threatened by genocidal slaughter." HRW and a UN investigator identified locations of large 
numbers of Rwandan Tutsi still alive and in need of protection. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 
which maintained medical staff in Kigali, decried inadequate actions by members of the UN 
Security Council. HWe have known for a month what is going on," MSF stated. "A clearly 
defmed and targeted United Nations intervention is not an option for Rwanda It is an obligation." 
U.S. Policy Response The U.S. goven1ment refused to allow its own aid officials to enter 
safe areas of Rwanda to assess humanitarian conditions. A HSituation Report" issued by the lJ.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) neglected to identify the ethnic nature of the killing 
and failed to characterize it directly as "genocide." The report described the violence as 
"indiscriminant massacres waged against the civilian population." 
Genocide Weeks 8-9 
USCR continued to contact U.S. officials to share findings of our site visit to Rwanda and 
urge specific U.S. measures. USCR emphasize:d that the emerging refugee crisis outside Rwanda 
should not distract American officials from addressing ongoing genocide inside Rwanda. 
USCR published a lengthy analysis in the Washington Post on June 5 indicating that a 
quarter-million to a half-million people were already murdered, but that "hundreds of thousands of 
Tutsi trapped in Rwanda can still be saved." USCR again urged U.S.leadership for rapid 
deployment of international troops, and predicted that many genocidaires would cease the 
massacres "at the first sign of UN troops." USCR stated that it was "hard to believe that Clinton 
would want to go down in history as the president who timidly allowed the clearest case of 
genocide that the world has seen in 50 years to proceed on his watch without taking action to stop 
it." Our analysis noted that U.S. officials "have refused to call it genocide because the word 
'genocide' carries heavy legal obligations under international law." USCR repeated its call for 
rapid U.S. humanitarian aid to survivors and other innocent civilians inside Rwanda and argued 
that "the U.S. State Department. .. should not allow diplomatic legalisms about sovereignty to slow 
assistance to civilians who are in need in rebel-controlled areas." 
HRW published a report reviewing the first two months of genocide and the international 
response. The report noted that various American officials had condemned the killings but 
concluded that leaders had taken "no effective response to the genocide." An HRW situation 
update on June 6 estimated "500,000 people [were] slain .. .in the last eight weeks" and stated that 
"the United States led the effort to withdraw UN. peacekeepers at the start of the crisis, just at the 
moment when reinforcernent and effective action by these troops could have limited the disastrous 
loss of life." The overall U.S. response to the genocide continued to be "tardy and weak," the 
organization stated. 
U.S. Policy Response The United States joined other UN Security Council members in 
giving final approval for deployment of UN troops. The troops did not arrive, however, until 
nearly two months later. U.S. officials repeated their pledge to give 50 armored personnel carriers 
to UN troops already deployed in Rwanda, but i1nposed restrictions that delayed delivery more 
than a month. Several U.S. officials began to describe the killings as genocide. The U.S. 
government stated it was "deeply distressed" that Rwanda's hate radio broadcasts continued to 
incite massacres, and U.S. officials requested that "responsible parties ... bring these broadcasts to 
an immediate halt." U.S. policy makers refused to jam the broadcasts, however. 
6 
Genocide Weeks 10-11 
USCR conducted a third site visit to genocide sites in Rwanda, accompanied by a ranking staff 
member of the U.S. Senate. USCR conducted a briefmg for Congressional staff in Washington 
and urged policy makers to take spec~fic steps to os~acize Rwru:da' s genocidal government and 
respond to the killings by implemenung the G~nocide ~onvention. USCR urged Congress to push 
for rapid deployment of international troops With sufficient mandate to top massacres and arrest 
perpetrators. USCR warned that official investigations into the genocide should proceed quickly to 
lay the groundwork for trials and punishment. 
USCR joined with an affiliated NGO to publish an "Action Alert" on June 8 that called for 
"U.S. resources to support an Africa peacekeeping force. The President must announce that the 
funds have been set aside [and] the equipment is available ... " The document reminded that 
"although as many as a half-million lives may have already been lost, the massacres 
continue ... [and] many lives may still be saved" if the U.S. would provide urgent support for a 
protection force. 
A coalition of NGOs and religious organizations urged the U.S. government to "publicly 
recognize that the atrocities in Rwanda constitute genocide" and to provide leadership and 
resources to facilitate immediate deployment of international troops "sufficient to protect potential 
victims and prevent further mass killings." The NGO coalition stated that it was "appalled that the 
United States lacks the political courage" to respond appropriately to the genocide. 
HRW criticized the U.S. government for forbidding its officials to describe the Rwandan 
killings as "genocide," as alleged by the New York Times.~ "How can this be defined as anything 
except genocide?" HRW stated. "The United States has not provided any protection to the helpless 
victims." In a letter to President Clinton on June 10, HRW criticized U.S. delays in providing 
vehicles needed by UN troops in Rwanda. "As the genocide enters its tenth week and approaches 
as many as half a million victims, further delay in providing the materiel and troops needed to 
:protect the innocent is immoral and unconscionable," HRW stated. The agency identified locations 
In Rwanda where religious personnel awaited rescue. 
An official of the Oxfam organization stated that "during the past months of slaughter, the 
United States has been the key player in halting action on Rwanda, creating a series of excuses and 
inventing problems that do not exist.', 
. . U.S. Policy Response U.S. officials conducted t.he government's first assessment trip 
Inside Rwanda since fleeing the country when the genocide began. U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, 
David Rawson, explained that the United States refused to characterize the massacres as genocide 
because "as a responsible government, you don't just go around hollering 'genocide."' U.S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher questioned whether there was "any particular macric in 
calling it genocide ... " In private discussions, Ambassador Rawson told USCR that R~anda was a 
"Hutu country" and that the United States was reluctant to jam Rwanda's hate radio broadcasts 
because "the U.S. has always stood for freedom of the airwaves." 
Genocide \Veek 12 
USCR concluded a site visit to Rwanda and briefed U.S. officials and NGOs in 
vya~hington D.C. regarding findings and recommendations. USCR informed authorities that 
killings continued in Rwanda, but at a slower pace. 
USCR issued an "Advocacy Action Alert" on June 27 offering 19 policy recommendations. 
The "Action Alert" specified six exact sites where trapped Rwandans awaited protection by 
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international troops, reiterated the need to jam extremist radio broadcasts inciting massacres, and 
urged international efforts to arrest suspected genocidaires still in Rwanda, in refugee camps, or 
traveling internationally. "Many militia leaders are escaping and pose a security risk in refugee 
camps ... ," we warned. USCR stated that "shamefully passive" U.S. officials should declare 
Rwanda's genocidal regime illegitimate and should "acknowledge reality and declare that the 
massacres in Rwanda constitute genocide as defmed under international law." The United States' 
failure "to confront the genocide constitutes a massive moral failure by the Clinton Administration 
and an historically sharneful abdication of moral leadership by the United States," the agency 
stated. 
The UN Commission for Human Rights issued a special report on June 28, based on an 
on-site investigation. The UN report declared that "genocide" had indeed occurred in Rwanda. 
The investigators reported that the massacres "being perpetrated at present are unprecedented in the 
history of the country and even in that of the entire Africa continent. They have taken on an extent 
unequalled in space and time." UN investigators said they were "absolutely certain" that the killing 
"appears to be well-orchestrated." The report concluded, "The massacres are all the more horrible 
and terrifying in that they give the impression of being planned, systematic, and atrocious .... 
Whole families are extenninated ... No one escapes, not even newborn babies." The report noted 
that the local radio station "does not hesitate to call for the extermination of the Tutsi, and it is 
notorious for the decisive role that it appears to have played in the massacres. It is known as the 
'killer radio station,' and justifiably so." 
U.S. Policy Response During the twelfth week of the genocide, the U.S. government 
voted in the UN Security Council to authorize deployment of French troops to Rwanda. U.S. 
officials continued to argue that jamming Rwanda's hate radio would violate international 
telecommunications law. 
Genocide Week 13 
USCR continued to brief U.S. officials about findings and recommendations from a 
recently completed visit to Rwanda. An editorial published by USCR reminded that "we should 
not lose sight of the fact that the horrible atrocities .. .in Rwanda are still occurring.... Terrified 
civilians who have sought refuge are still in dire danger." USCR issued a "Rwanda Fact Sheet" 
recommending stronger U.S. efforts to speed UN' troops to Rwanda. USCR called for increased 
medical and other humanitarian aid inside Rwanda and urged the U.S. government to provide 
diplomatic and resource support for rapid human rights documentation of the genocide in 
preparation for eventual trials of genocidaires. 
A coalition of 14 NGOs, including USCR, issued a "Statement on Rwanda Crisis" on June 
30. The coalition stated that "the most pressing issue facing the United States today regarding 
Africa is the apparent lack of policy toward the ongoing genocide in Rwanda." The statement 
urged the U.S. government to: "provide immediate logistical and financial support for an African 
peacekeeping force"; "take immediate action to shut down" hate radio broadcasts; and 
"acknowledge that the killing of several hundred thousand Rwandans is the result of a planned, 
systematic genocide." 
U.S. Policy Response During the thirteenth week of genocide, the U.S. government 
joined with other UN Security Council members in authorizing a "Commission of Experts" to 
analyze genocide evidence. 
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Genocide's Final Weeks 
USCR issued a public advisory o~ July 12 dr~wing att~ntio,n to the recent report by ct:e UN 
Commission on Human Ricrhts investigating Rwanda s genocide. 'The report warrants special 
attention," USCR said. US°CR issued a July 20 statement urging humanitarian and diplomatic 
support for Rwanda's new government in th~ ~ermath of_ th~ genocidal reg~e' s military .defeat. 
"Failure to respond adequately to the humarutanan needs ms1de Rwanda ... will unnecessarily 
reinforce the dependency and exile of refugees outside the country," the statement advised. 
USCR joined other NGOs and UN officials on a site visit to Rwanda and neighboring 
countries in late July; the visit included the so-called French Zone in southwest Rwanda, where 
French troops were deployed and genocidaire leaders continued to circulate. On July 29, we 
published an "Advocacy Action Alert" with 16 policy recommendations, and warned that the newly 
exiled regime of genocidaires "continues to disseminate its propaganda in the refugee camps, 
terrorizing Hutu refugees ... " USCR recommended that UN troops disarm genocidaires in the 
refugee camps and detain them. "Remnants of the former regime appear to be preparing for a 
future invasion of Rwanda. These hardline elements must not be permitted to continue their ways 
in Zaire," USCR advised. 
As the genocide subsided, a UN human rights official decried the international inaction: "It 
seems ... quite difficult to admit that in this century you can have a massacre of up to a half a million 
people with everyone watching." 
U.S. Policy Response As the campaign of genocide drew to an end (later resumed and 
continued into 1998 on a different scale), the U.S. government on July 15 withdrew official 
diplomatic recognition from the Rwandan government that had perpetrated the genocide. One 
week later, U.S. Ambassador Rawson returned to Kigali to meet with officials of the new 
government. 
<><><> 
This lengthy summary is far from exhaustive. USCR and other NGOs made many efforts 
not mentioned here to inform and prod U.S. officials toward effective action that never 
materialized. The purpose of this compilation is to make the record crystal clear that the U.S. 
govefi!ment cannot say now that it did not know or understand what was happening then. 
Yet that is exactly what President Clinton now claims. President Clinton told Rwandans 
during his visit there in March that he personally "did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed 
with which [Rwandans] were engulfed by this unimaginable terror." Mr. Chairman, this is an 
extraordinary statement. 
If we take the President at his word, then we are left to believe that our massive U.S. 
government-with all its intelligence gathering, analytic capacity, diplomatic contacts, and massive 
resources-suffered a monumental failure by neglecting to inform adequately its own leader about 
the clearest genocide the human race has seen in nearly 50 years. Mr. Chairman, a governmental 
communications breakdown of that magnitude is worthy of close examination by Concrress, the 
State Department, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and other pertinent ~s of the 
U.S. government. 
An alternative explanation is that weak U.S. policies and the glaring lack of stroncr moral 
leadership during the Rwandan genocide stemmed not from a lack of knowledcre but fro~ a lack 
of interest and political will. o ' 
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III. U.S. Policy Failures During the Genocide 
The above revie·w suggests numerous failures of U.S. policy. Government leaders from 
the beginning refused to acknowledge that a true genocide was occurring in Rwanda. This 
massive failure--or refusal-to recognize genocide and respond appropriately against it was a . 
shameful moment and produced policies that were politically ineffectual and at times 
counterproductive. For example: 
• U.S. officials and other world leaders refused to invoke the Genocide Convention, which 
would have provided a legal framework to take action against the mass murders in Rwanda. The 
non-response to the killing may have effectively permanently eviscerated the Genocide Convention 
as a component of intern.ationallaw. 
• U.S. leadership in support of the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops as soon as the 
genocide began effectively condemned hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to certain death and 
gave the killers confidence that the world community would allow the genocide to proceed 
uninterrupted. 
• Even after the United States government reversed course and belatedly agreed to authorize 
additional UN peacekeeping troops, U.S. officials delayed the troop deployment for months, 
effectively giving the killers in Rwanda a grace period to complete their campaign of genocide. 
• U.S. officials allowed their own bureaucratic technicalities to delay delivery of 50 armored 
vehicles for more than a month to several hundred UN peacekeepers who remained in Rwanda. 
The poorly equipped UN soldiers saved the lives of thousands of Rwandans; more vehicles and 
other basic equipment might have helped save tens of thousands of additional lives at no significant 
cost or danger to the United States. Unwilling to commit U.S. soldiers or to deploy additional UN 
troops rapidly, the failure to send urgently needed basic military equipment displayed a 
lackadaisical attitude by U.S. officials that was careless and mean-spirited. 
• The United States and other world powers refused repeated entreaties to shut down the 
propaganda radio broadcasts of Rwanda's genocidaires even though the vehement broadcasts were 
clearly pivotal in inciting and sustaining genocide. The continued broadcasts helped create a new 
humanitarian emergency by encouraging the exodus of more than 1 million Hutu Rwandan 
refugees into neighboring Congo/Zaire. 
• The U.S. govermnent continued to grant diplomatic recognition to the genocidaires during 
their entire campaign of slaughter. This reluctance by U.S. officials to break diplomatic relations 
sent the wrong message to extremists in Rwanda and to repressive regimes elsewhere in the world. 
• The U.S. and other world powers failed to disarm or arrest genocidaires at their weakest 
moment, during their retreat to refugee camps in neighboring countries. This set the stage for new 
rounds of bloodshed and regional instability that continue to this day, serious crippling Rwanda.' s 
recovery. 
• Although some branches of the U.S. government appeared to welcome information and 
analysis from NGOs during the genocide, many State Department officials appeared uninterested in 
receiving outside analysis, based on USCR' s experience. While near the Uganda-Rwanda border, 
for example, Ambassador Rawson refused USCR' s request that he travel with USCR into secure 
areas of Rwanda to see first-hand the impact of the genocide. Failures such as this might have 
compounded the State Department's lack of urgency and uncreative policy making. 
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• U.S. humanitarian officials, including experts at OFDA, did not conduct assessment trips 
into secure areas of Rwanda until the eleventh week of the genocide. This slow reaction impeded 
aid to o-enocide survivors and war victims inside the country, many of whom were suffering from 
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horrific wounds and trauma. 
• By failing to acknowledge in a forthright rri~er that genocide-the ultimate c~me agai:r:st 
humanity-was occurring in Rwanda, U.S. leaders did not properl~' educa~e the Ame?can public 
about what was happening and why. As a result, much of the pubhc. remruns largely 1gnorant to 
this day about the historic nature of the awful events that took place 1n Rwanda, and the lessons 
that should be learned from Rwanda's tragedy. 
<><><> 
In addition, Mr. Chairman, we would like to draw your attention to a little-noticed report, 
Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, published in March 1996 by 20 major humanitarian donor 
governments, including the United States, and 18 international humanitarian assistance agencies. 
The report laid several specific failures at the doorstep of U.S. policy makers: 
• "By omission and commission, the -role of the United States was critical .... By not 
utilizing its capacity to act, and its formal leadership role in the United Nations, the U.S. must take 
considerable responsibility for the overall failure of the UN to respond" in a timely manner, the 
report stated. " ... By acts of omission, the United States ensured that neither an effective national 
response nor a collective UN effort to mitigate the genocide materialized." 
• "In the shadow of Som4}ia, the American and UN observers misinterpreted events on the 
ground [in Rwanda] and exaggerated difficulties into an impotence to respond effectively~" the 
report stated. 
• "Even such a concrete and seemingly clear-cut issue as hate radio was too problematic for 
the international community to deal with," the report concluded. "Although the vitriolic Radio 
J1;Jilles Collines clearly qualified as hannful and attacked even members of the diplomatic corps in 
Kigali, there was no decision to take forceful measures to silence it. Both the French and 
American ambassadors opposed such action. [U.S.] Ambassador Rawson claimed that Radio 
Milles Collines was the best radio for information, and its euphemisms were subject to many 
interpretations." 
"The idea of jamming the radio was discussed in a preliminary fashion" within the U.S. 
government, the report said. But jamming never occurred in part because "the United States was 
in principle wedded to a broad view of freedom of speech." 
<><><> 
Mr. Chairman, a thorough and truly revealing probe of U.S. government failures during 
the Rwandan genocide should include in-depth testimony by officials who were in key decision-
making and fact collection positions during mid-1994. That roster would include former Secretary 
of S_tate Warren Christopher, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa George .Nioose, former U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David 
Rawson, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Prudence Bushnell, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck, USAID 
Administrator Brian Atwood, former Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Nan 
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Borten, former National Security Council Director for Africa Donald Steinberg, former DCM to 
Rwanda Joyce Lieder, as well as numerous others. And, Mr. Chairman, the question must be 
asked, what did the House of Representatives 2md the Senate of the United Stated do in a timely 
way to force an effective response to the genocide? 
It is regrettable that none of these people are testifying at this hearing. Their remarks would 
be extremely valuable jn identifying mistakes and why those mistakes occurred. Someday their 
voices should be heard if we are serious about strengthening U.S. policy making in moments of 
crisis. 
IV. Steps to Improve U.S. Policy lVIaking and Response 
It is the view of USCR that the failure by the United States and the international community 
to respond appropriately to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was not in any way, shape, or form a 
failure caused by poor information or inadequate technology. Our private discussions with U.S. 
officials and others during and after the genocide indicate that key parts of the U.S. government 
had a good understanding of what was occurring on the ground in Rwanda. Therefore, post-
genocide discussions about the lack of "early warning" or similar defects are disingenuous, mere 
smokescreens to divert attention from the obvious fact that U.S. policy makers simply chose not to 
act. 
The U.S. media's general failure to report accurately what was occurring during the 
genocide only facilitated the morally vacuous approach adopted at the time by the Clinton 
Administration. With the American public confused and distracted, the Clinton Administration was 
free to make a choice not to respond in any meaningful way to stop genocide. 
That choice by lJ.S. officials did not end when the genocide "ended'' in mid-1994. The 
U.S. choice to remain passive continued throughout the next two years, as genocidaires rearmed in 
eastern Congo/Zaire and resumed the genocide inside Rwanda. Once again, there was no lack of 
understanding among U.S. officials about what was occurring in the refugee camps-cum-military 
bases in Congo/Zaire. American authorities who needed to know, knew. Some NGOs took the 
dramatic step of withdrawing from the camps in eastern Congo/Zaire on moral grounds, citing the 
control exerted in the camps by genocidaires and the resumption of military activity. Throughout 
the refugee period of 1994-96, U.S. authorities chose the course of inaction. The U.S. strategy 
was to wait for the situation on the ground in Central Africa to change itself, in hopes that U.S. 
policy makers would be presented with a painless set of new policy options. As the situation in the 
region continued to deteriorate into worsening bloodshed during 1996, the Rwandan government 
took action to pursue its own national security interests, with all of the controversial implications 
that action precipitated. 
Mr. Chairman, lJ.S. policy toward Rwanda during 1994-96 was more frequently wrong 
than right, more irresponsible than responsible. President Clinton seemed to offer an apology of 
sorts during his visit to Rwanda, and he indicated that the U.S. government would "improve ... our 
system." But what does this mean? It remains unclear what changes, if any, are being put in 
place. In any case, how does one instill political backbone where one is lacking, or insert a moral 
compass when the goven1ment's is broken? 
Part of the answer, we believe, is through accountability. The U.S. Committee for 
Refugees encourages this Subcommittee to promote the creation of a commission to study the 
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performance of the U.S. government pertaining to the genocide during the 33 months beginning 
January 1994. The mandate of the commission should be to depose, unde~ o~th, U.S. . . 
officials-many of them cited above-and others as necessary. The comrmss1on should Identify 
the political and moral failures within the U.S. go"Y:rnment that J~d to sue~ tragic conseque?-ces, . 
and to formulate mechanisms for better accountability to help m.ttlgate agamst such gross failures In 
the future. Such a commission, composed of public and expert members, should report to 
Congress and the American people early next year. 
Bel crium and France have initiated special inquiries in an effort to understand their 
governments' roles during the 1994 genocide. Today's hearing might be the start of a U.S. 
inquiry, but a single hearing lasting a few hours is hardly sufficient in time or in scope to 
thoroughly consider our own government's role. The United States of America, the world's only 
superpower, the essential leader within the UN, the country that regularly judges the actions of 
other nations, should itself be held to the highest standard of accountability. Individual American 
officials should be accountable for the decisions they made during the fatefully bloody weeks of 
1994 and afterwards. 
We at USCR believe that the appointment of a commission composed of official and public 
participants to review thoroughly U.S. actions and inactions in 1994 is appropriate. Indeed, it 
appears essential in order to educate and help the American people our own future leaders 
understand our society's massive failure to respond to genocide, the ultimate crime against 
humanity. 
V. Genocide's Legacy in Rwanda Today 
This Subcommittee has indicated that one purpose of this hearing is to examine "continuing 
cycles of violence" in Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. 
For a fuller discussion of this matter, we refer you to our report, Life After Death: 
Suspicion and Reintegration in Post-Genocide Rwanda, published in February 1998. The report 
examines the attitudes and psychology pervading Rwandan society four years after the genocide, 
as well as security issues, governance, problems of land and housing, the economy, health needs, 
food shortages, demographics, and other issues. The report contains 15 policy recommendations. 
Copies of Life After Death are readily available from the U.S. Committee for Refugees. 
Rarely in human history has a society insisted that all its people live together again, side by 
side, in the aftermath of genocide. That is, however, the task at hand in Rwanda. The people of 
Rwanda are attempting to do what few societies in recorded history have ever done. In response to 
the _Armenian genocide earlier this century, the international community carved out an independent 
nation for the Armenian people. After the Holocaust, the world created a sovereign Jewish state, 
Israel. After the "killing fields" of Cambodia in the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians 
permanently resettled in other countries. In modern-day Bosnia, ethnic cleansing has produced 
defacto separation. 
. Post-genocide Rwanda~ however, is charting a dramatically different course. The country 
and Its people are trying to endure as one after being torn apart by an attempt to annihilate an entire 
group. The ch~Ien~e _is, arguably: unique in m?dern times. Rarely has any society of any age 
suffe:ed genocide, civil war, massive refugee flight, hate propaganda, a culture of impunity, 
ongotng insurgency, and still managed to emerge intact. 
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Deep concern about personal safety has become ingrained in Rwandans. The armed 
insurgency by genocidaires-primarily in the northwest but occasionally erupting in other pockets 
of the west--costs large numbers of lives and poisons attitudes nationwide. Counterinsurgency 
offensives by the govennment military, the RPA., have killed innocent civilians as well as 
genocidaires. Many Tutsi view the insurgency as proof that the campaign of genocide continues 
against them, that they are still being preyed upon in their own country. Many Hutu fear that they 
might be victimized by revenge killings, detention, or other injustices. 
This is the context for the current cycle of violence in Rwanda. Estimates of the death toll 
in 1997 varied widely, from 3,000 to 8,000, or more. International organizations, including the 
UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
have limited their own presence in Rwanda's northwest conflict area due to fears about staff safety. 
USCR conducted two site visits to northwest Rwanda late last year, and traveled to rural areas 
deep in the conflict area. The paucity of regula[· first-hand reporting of northwest Rwanda's 
bloodshed is a major problem for the international community, and has intensified the sense of 
isolation felt by many local residents who believe the international community has abandoned 
them. 
It is important to stress, Mr. Chairman, that there is another, more hopeful, side to this 
bleak picture of violence. Rwanda's insurgency and the most egregious abuses by the RP A 
primarily occur in the northwest comer of the country. By any measurement, the majority of 
Rwanda remains relatively free of wholesale violence. Citizens in most areas of the country are 
struggling to cope with social tensions in peaceful ways. 
. Unfortunately, the international community tends to oversimplify Rwanda. Many foreign 
observers initially overestimated how quickly Rwandans could "reconcile" after the genocide of 
1994 and massive refugee repatriation of 1996-97. More recent conventional wisdom threatens to 
dismiss Rwanda incorrectly as a "lost cause." On the contrary, the people of post-genocide 
Rwanda are engaged in one of the most complicated social phenomenons in human history. They 
have not yet succeeded, but they certainly have not yet failed. Rwandans' efforts to live together 
again deserve the fullest and wisest support the United States can provide. 
Recommendations to U.S. policy makers regarding current-day Rwanda: 
• Sustain U.S. financial and diplomatic support for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda. 
• Help maintain a UN arms monitoring progrrun in the region to enforce the existing arms embargo 
against the former government of Rwanda. 
• Encourage Rwandan government's prosecution of abuses by RP A soldiers, particularly in the 
northwest. 
• Work with Rwandan officials, other Central African leaders, and UNHCR to improve adherence 
to international refugee law and norms of refugee protection, which have been dangerously eroded 
in the region. 
• Provide aid that is flexibly tailored to the needs of different areas of Rwanda and different 
segments of the Rwandan population. 
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• Provide full funding for the Administration's proposed Great Lakes Justice Initiative to 
strengthen Rwanda's still-overwhelmed justice system. 
• Make more resources available to Rwandans to facilitate individual counseling and national social 
dialogue in the aftermath of the genocide and to lessen current social tensions. 
• Provide resources and encouragement to help make Rwandan government more proactive in 
identifying and resolving property disputes which otherwise threaten to build resenetment among 
many Hutu residents. 
• Provide funding to conduct thorough assessments of Rwandan resettlement sites to ensure that 
chosen sites can adequately support new populations~ 
<><><> 
We thank you Mr. Chainnan, and Congresswoman McKinney, and all other Members of 
this Subcommittee, for your interest in the well-being of the Rwandan people. 
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